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ABSTRACT: It is commonplace to call for the protection of environmental
diversity. I develop an often overlooked reason for preserving diversity: we
should preserve diversity in order to preserve the unusual. I show that we do in
fact value the unusual, and that we should value the unusual (pace Rolston and
Russow).  Recognizing  the  value  of  the  unusual  provides  a  foundation  for
valuing species not otherwise considered valuable.
It is commonplace to call for the protection of environmental diversity. We wish to preserve
species of animals, plants, birds, and so on, and the various habitats which support them. A
number of compelling reasons have been put forth for valuing such diversity. For example,
it has been argued that we should value the preservation of species as we may come to find,
at some future point, that certain species can be used in important products. Other species,
even if they are not themselves economically valuable, may be of value insofar as they
interact with, and support the survival of, economically valuable species. Furthermore, a
certain  degree  of  biological  diversity  is  required  to  help  protect  us  against  massive
ecological disaster. (2)
Others have argued that we should value environmental diversity as a source of aesthetic
values — beautiful species, sublime wildernesses, and so on. (3) Diversity provides us with
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a  wide  range  of  objects  for  various  sciences.  We  also  enjoy  recreational  activities  in
wilderness areas — another source of value. (4)  Finally, we might claim that we should
particularly value endangered species due to their rarity — much as collectors value rare
books or recordings. (5)
While I believe these to be excellent reasons for valuing environmental diversity, in this
paper  I  wish  to  isolate  and  develop  an  additional,  surprisingly  overlooked  reason  for
valuing environmental diversity. I propose that a key reason that we value such diversity is
that we value the unusual in general. My procedure will be to show that we do, in fact,
value the unusual. I will then argue that we should value the unusual. Finally, I will show
that focusing on this value allows us to understand our intuitions concerning a number of
test cases.
1. Diversity and the Unusual
We can best begin to isolate the value we place on the unusual by considering concrete
examples. First, consider this brief excerpt from Thoreau's Walden:
One day when I went out to my wood-pile, or rather my pile of stumps, I observed two large
ants,  the  one  red,  the  other  much  larger,  nearly  half  an  inch  long,  and  black,  fiercely
contending with each other. Having once got hold they never let go, but struggled and wrestled
and rolled on the chips incessantly. Looking farther, I was surprised to find that the chips were
covered with such combatants, that it was not a duellum, but a bellum, a war between two
races of ants, the red always pitted against the black, and frequently two red ones to one black.
The legions of these Myrmidons covered all  the hills  and vales in my woodyard,  and the
ground was already strewn with the dead and the dying, both red and black. It was the only
battle which I have witnessed, the only battle-field I ever trod while the battle was raging. (6)
Thoreau's description of the battle goes on for a number of pages. Clearly, Thoreau is quite
fascinated by this battle and is absorbed in observing it. His long description of the scene
suggests that he also expects his readers to be intrigued. Consider next the following facts
about giraffes, taken from a popular book of "nature facts":
They have bulgy eyes (and use them to see well in all directions), hairy lips, a tongue as long
as 18 inches (convenient for curling around leaves), and a 25 pound heart for pumping blood
to their extremities. They often eat more than 125 pounds of vegetation every day [...] When
they bend down to get a drink of water, which they can go days without, special valves close to
prevent a huge rush of blood to their brains, and their legs spread as if to split. (7)
I would now like to show that our intrigue and curiosity in the face of these descriptions
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(and, of course, others like them) suggest a value for environmental diversity which does
not seem to be adequately accounted for in recent literature on this subject.
Clearly,  we derive pleasure from experiencing and learning about the natural  world.  In
some cases this is due to a creature or environment being beautiful, in others because it is
rare. But frequently our intrigue is simply due to our finding a creature or environment
unusual. Ants are not rare, nor are they beautiful, yet they arouse our interest. Giraffes are
both  rarer  and  perhaps  more  beautiful  than  ants,  but  our  interest  seems  to  be  pushed
primarily by their unique appearance and unusual features. We fascinated by the giraffe's
long neck and gangly legs, regardless of its beauty (or lack thereof). In preserving natural
diversity we preserve unusual species and environments.
Our fascination with the unusual in the natural world is an aspect of our broader interest in
the unusual, tout court. This interest is reflected in the existence of museums and galleries
which frequently display unusual objects, even if they are not beautiful. The Guiness Book
of World Records, and various tabloids also reflect this interest, albeit in a less appealing
context. The value we place on the unusual in nature is shown by the large number of
people who frequent zoos and parks, and the popularity of documentaries and books on
living creatures and their unusual means of capturing prey, attracting a mate, and so on.
Thus, we do value the unusual and the unique — both the manmade and the natural. Still,
we may ask whether or not this  is  a value we should have.  After all,  there have been
cultures which have valued such things as racial purity or the institution of slavery. Clearly,
the mere fact that we value something is not sufficient to answer the normative question of
whether a given value is appropriate.
2. Should We Value The Unusual?
First, let us consider whether there are any sound reasons for holding that we should not
value the unusual. Consider the following argument from Lily-Marlene Russow:
Some appeals to intrinsic value [of species] are grounded in the intuition that diversity itself is
a virtue. If so, it would seem incumbent upon us to create new species wherever possible, even
bizarre ones that  would have no purpose other than to be different.  Something other than
diversity must therefore be valued. (8)
While Russow's argument is explicitly presented against valuing diversity for its own sake,
the point could be applied to valuing the unusual. Wouldn't valuing the unusual force us to
create new, unusual species with no purpose other than to be unusual?
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Holmes Rolston III presents a similar argument in a recent book: Diversity is regularly
valuable; "variety is the spice of life." Diversity is not, however, ipso facto a value. Were a
university to receive an applicant from a foreign country, a young prince who wished to
bring along his personal slave, would the university permit this, on grounds that it would
add diversity? No, because justice is more important than diversity. Added perversity is not
desirable diversity. Diversity is not valuable simply for its own sake. (9)
Both arguments suggest that if  we value diversity or the unusual for its own sake (i.e.
intrinsically), we will be forced into valuing things which it seems we do not want to value
— randomly creating odd species, or unusual, immoral practices. The conclusion is that we
therefore cannot value diversity or the unusual for its own sake.
However, these arguments do not support the strong conclusion that Russow and Rolston
wish to draw. These arguments simply show that we must balance the intrinsic value we
place on the unusual with other values. As Rolston himself notes, justice can override the
value we place on the unusual, as in the case of the foreign prince with a personal slave. We
shouldn't create new, unusual species which will not have a suitable environment, or will
suffer enormously, or if the creation of the species will take up funds better spent on other
projects, and so on. But none of this shows that we don't value the unusual intrinsically —
it only shows that this value can be overidden by other values.
We can clarify this point by considering some additional cases. Imagine that a house is
burning down and a person is forced to choose between saving a beautiful painting and a
young child. Surely we believe that the person ought to save the child and not the painting.
But this does not yet show that we do not value the beautiful intrinsically — it merely
shows that this value is only one value amongst many, and that it can be overidden. Susan
Wolf  has  argued that  moral  saints  would lead an impoverished life,  (10)  but  again  this
suggests only that moral values may need to be balanced with other values, not that we
don't value morality intrinsically. Indeed, it seems clear that we do value the beautiful and
the moral intrinsically, and I suggest that, similarly, we value the unusual intrinsically. We
only have to bear in mind that these values, even if intrinsic need to be balanced properly.
Are there other reasons to believe that we should not value the unusual? Perhaps valuing
the unusual is 'shallow', and thus not desirable. We can imagine a time not long ago when
people would crowd to see so-called 'freakshows'. They went to see the unusual, but this
seems a dubious thing to value. It seems that valuing the unusual may simply be a matter of
pointing and gawking at things with which we are not familiar.
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In response, we should again consider a specific example. There are people who have only
a shallow appreciation of music or other arts. Perhaps they only listen to maudlin melodies
or the latest hit singles. They may appreciate the beauty of the music to some extent, but
their  appreciation seems quite  shallow.  On the  other  hand,  there  will  be  listeners  who
become knowledgeable about music and composers,  can identify various compositional
structures, modalities, and so on. Their appreciation of music will likely be much richer and
admirable.
I believe a similar range of possibilities exists when we consider the appreciation of the
unusual. At its shallowest, it may involve nothing more than a simple-minded gawking at
something an individual does not understand. But we can move beyond this, just as we
move beyond shallow aesthetic appreciation. In its more refined forms our appreciation of
the unusual creates a sense of wonder and fascination within us. We come to desire an
understanding of what is presented to us. We may develop something of a love for certain
unusual objects. Thoreau's absorption in the ants' battle is hardly shallow.
These last considerations point to positive values for appreciating the unusual. We derive
pleasure from witnessing the unusual. We are often inspired to learn about the objects of
our fascination. The unusual gives us stories and information we can share with others.
When we are  entranced by the unusual  in  nature  we gain  a  respect  for  nature  and its
workings — be they guided by God or by natural laws alone.
I hope to have shown that valuing the unusual is not a shallow value, nor must it be merely
instrumentally valuable. Rather, we merely need to bear in mind that the value we place on
the unusual can be overriden by other values. In addition, there are positive reasons for
valuing the unusual—we derive pleasure and fascination from experiencing it, we can be
inspired by it, and so on. Thus, I take it that we should value the unusual.
3. Consequences of Valuing the Unusual
If the unusual is recognized as valuable, a number of intuitive consequences result when we
consider various test cases, and when we compare this value to other values which have
been posited for protecting natural diversity.
First, let us compare valuing the unusual with valuing aesthetic qualities. Russow maintains
that  there  are  some  species  which,  by  no  stretch  of  the  imagination,  are  aesthetically
significant.  But  aesthetic  value  can cover  a  surprising range of  things:  a  tiger  may be
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simply beautiful; a blue-whale is awe-inspiring; a bird might be decorative; an Appaloosa
is of interest because of its historical significance; and even a drab little plant may inspire
admiration for the marvelous way it has been adapted to a special environment. Even so,
there may be species such as the snail darter that simply have no aesthetic value. In these
cases, lacking any alternative we may be forced to the conclusion that such species are not
worth preserving.  (11)  First,  notice  that  valuing the  unusual  provides  us  with  reason to
preserve  the  snail  darter  (and  other  species  or  environments)  while  valuing  aesthetic
qualities alone may not. The snail darter is unusual in being found only in a particular body
of water in Tennessee. Many creatures are not beautiful, but are unusual. The platypus is
hardly beautiful, but it is quite unusual, and as such is worth protecting. The two values
complement each other. (12)
A second point to note is that Russow seems to extend the term 'aesthetic' too far. Being of
historical interest is not an aesthetic value. Drab little plants are not aesthetically valuable
— if their adapting to a special environment is valuable, it is because the environment and
the adaptations are unusual. Thus, valuing the unusual (i) allows us to value creatures and
environments which are not aesthetically valuable, and (ii) allows us to avoid extending the
notion of aesthetic value beyond its intuitive scope.
Next, we can compare valuing the unusual and valuing the rare. Prima facie, it seems that
these two notions should be intimately linked. The unusual cannot be the commonplace.
Still, while the unusual and the rare are closely linked, there are differences. Consider a
subspecies of ants which is limited to a few small colonies, but which differs from other
related ants only in having slightly longer legs. Compare this to (let us imagine) a relatively
large, healthy population of elephants. I would suggest that the elephants are more unusual
than the subspecies of ants, even while the ants are rarer than the elephants. There are few
creatures the size of elephants, or with trunks like elephants, and so on. On the other hand,
there would be many subspecies  of  ants  which seem very similar  to  the subspecies  in
question. Essentially, the difference between the two groups of creatures is that the ants are
rare  only  in  terms  of  population,  while  the  elephants  are  rare  in  terms  of  species
characteristics.
This difference between the unusual and the merely rare (in terms of population) is quite
important. For valuing the unusual allows us to value species which are unlike most others,
even if such species have large populations. If we valued only population rarity we would
have little grounds for protecting species until they became endangered. This seems to be a
good consequence of valuing the unusual — surely we want to value unique species before
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they become endangered. On the other hand, we should notice that becoming rare in terms
of  population  is  also  a  way  of  becoming  unusual.  There  will  be  few opportunities  to
experience such a species. When we discover that there is only a small number of a species
left our curiousity will tend to be piqued. It has become unusual.
It may be suggested that if a species is common (in terms of population) then it cannot be
considered unusual because there are too many tokens of the type, too many members of
the species. This can be seen to be mistaken, however, if we focus on an example. Consider
the music of a composer such as John Cage or Philip Glass. Such music is very unusual,
and remains unusual despite the thousands of compact discs (tokens) recorded of it. The
music is unusual compared to other music, regardless of the number of recordings made of
it. Similarly, an unusual species will be unusual compared to other species, regardless of
the number of members of the species.
Rolston writes  the  following concerning rare  (in  terms of  population)  species:The rare
species  offer  promise  and  memory  of  an  inventive  natural  history.  They do  pique  our
curiousity; they are exotic and entertaining because they are rare. But that does not yet get
at their real worth, which is that they are extraordinary manifestations of survival. (13)
In response to this, I would make two points. First, rare species are exotic and entertaining
because they are unusual, and one reason that they are unusual is that they are rare. Second,
Rolston  suggests  that  the  real  value  of  rare  species  lies  in  their  being  "extraordinary
manifestations of survival". I suggest that this can be captured by valuing the unusual — to
be an extraordinary manifestation of survival is to be an unusual or unique manifestation of
survival. Having an unusual method of survival in difficult circumstances is yet another
way of being unusual.
Thus we can see that our valuing of the unusual provides important additional grounds for
valuing  environmental  diversity.  It  supports  our  intuition  that  we  should  value  many
species that are not aesthetically valuable. It grounds our intuition that we should value
species with unusual characteristics even if they are not endangered. On the other hand, it
also  captures  the  intuition  that  we  should  value  species  which  are  rare  in  terms  of
population. We value the unusual and we should value the unusual; recognition of this is a
crucial step in coming to understand the full value of environmental diversity.
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